The transposition of the Private Enforcement Directive: a critical perspective by Costeira, Maria José
UNIO - EU Law Journal. Vol. 3, No. 2, July 2017, pp 148-157.
®2017 Centre of  Studies in European Union Law
School of  Law – University of  Minho 
The transposition of  the Private Enforcement Directive: a 
critical perspective
Maria José Costeira*
ABSTRACT: This article analyses the proposal of  transposition of  the Private Enforcement 
Directive into the Portuguese legal system. It examines several aspects of  the preliminary draft, which 
went through public discussion, but it highlights, specially, the articles about definitions, liability, 
means of  proof  and the potential impacts it could have on the organisation of  the Portuguese 
judicial system. It criticises the incoherencies and points out some problematic aspects of  the proposal 
and the necessary amendments that should be made to make the law stronger. 
KEYWORDS: Private Enforcement Directive – competition law – Portuguese legal system – 
proposal of  transposition – judicial organisation.
* Portuguese judge at the General Court of  the Court of  Justice of  the European Union.
® UNIO - EU LAW JOURNAL Vol. 3, No. 2, July 2017
149 Maria José Costeira
On 26th November 2014 was approved the Directive 2014/104/EU of  the 
European Parliament and of  the Council on certain rules governing actions for 
damages under national law for infringements of  the competition law provisions 
of  the Member States and of  the European Union. That Directive, usually called 
Directive Enforcement, had to be transposed into national law by Member States by 
27th December 2016 (Article 21).
In Portugal, the National Competition Authority (Autoridade da Concorrência 
– AdC), the entity in charge of  preparing the transposition, presented, on the 22nd 
June 2016, the last proposal of  a preliminary draft for the transposition, which 
resulted from a process of  public discussion.
Such last version is the one on which this paper is based. I intend to draw 
attention to some aspects that could be improved. Intentionally, for reasons of  time 
and space, a few topics are left out of  the analysis, as the quantum of  damages or 
access to means of  proof.
The analysis will be centred essentially on Article 2 (Definitions), Article 
3 (Liability), Article 7 (Evidential Value) and Article 22 (Amendments to the statue of  
Organisation of  the Judicial System).
I. Article 2 - Definitions
This article presents a number of  definitions and concepts that are referred 
to over the text of  the proposal, similarly to Article 2 of  the Directive. It has been 
chosen to include definitions which are not given in the equivalent Article of  the 
Directive, to alter their order and to supress others.
Concerning the inclusion of  concepts absent in Article 2 of  the Directive, the 
notions of  cartel and of  extra-judicial settlement – subparagraphs c) and r) must be 
highlighted.
Subparagraph c) Cartel
“Cartel, the agreement or concerted action between two or more competing companies which 
aims at coordinating their competition behaviour in the market or influencing the relevant competition 
standards through acts such as, namely, fixing or coordinating the prices of  acquisition or sell or 
other conditions of  transactions, including in relation to rights of  intellectual property, attribution 
of  production or sell quotas, sharing markets and clients, including the concertation in auctions and 
public procurements, restricting importations or exportations or conducting anti-competitive acts 
against other competitors as prohibited by Article 9 of  the Law nº. 19/2012, of  8th May, and if  
applicable by Article 101, TFEU”. 
The infractions of  the competition law are enshrined in an autonomous statue: 
the Law of  Competition (LdC), approved by the Law n. 19/2012 of  8th May. The 
proposal I examine here does not intend to change, define or dispose in any other way, 
about the infractions, as expressively resulting from Article 1 and the Explanatory 
Statement of  the proposal. It is at stake only the regulation of  some aspects of  the 
action for damages caused by infractions of  competition law.
The inclusion of  the notion of  cartel in this preliminary draft, a typical infraction 
of  the competition law, is at first unnecessary, given that such infraction is well 
defined in Article 9, LdC. Not only is it unnecessary, but it is also counterproductive 
once the characterisation of  cartel is different from the notion in Article 9. That 
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alone may provoke useless and pointless interpretation doubts.
Subparagraph r) extra-judicial settlement
“Extra-judicial settlement”, any mechanism that allows the parties to extra-judicially resolve 
their dispute concerning the claim for compensation, namely mediation, conciliation, arbitration and 
the transaction foreseen in Article 1248 of  the Civil Code”. 
Extra-judicial settlement is the generic designation to all forms of  alternative 
dispute resolution in comparison to what we may call traditional or conventional 
form, which is recourse to court. Mediation, arbitration and conciliation are the 
typical forms of  extra-judicial settlement. Transaction, on the other hand, could be 
an alternative form of  resolution or not, i.e., transaction is possible, and I would say 
even frequent, during the course of  legal proceedings. In that case, although it is an 
amicable and consensual form of  settlement, it is not an extra-judicial settlement tout 
court, primarily because it depends on a judicial ruling of  homologation.
The option to define the possible ways of  extra-judicial settlement in a statue 
that intends to regulate some specificities of  a determined sort of  civil suit seems 
senseless, as if  nothing had been provided for, they would all be possible. 
It should be noted that the Directive defines “consensual dispute resolution” and 
not extra-judicial settlement. It does so as any mechanism of  extra-judicial dispute 
settlement that allows the parties to reach an agreement as to the claim for damages 
(Article 2, paragraph 21) is allowed, which is considerably distinct than enunciating 
the forms of  extra-judicial settlement.
Regarding the suppression of  some definitions presented in the Directive, I 
draw attention to the definitions of  “action for damages” and “claim for damages”. One 
might ask: was it necessary to include those definitions? Maybe it was not. But it is 
certain that there was no need to define “extra-judicial settlement” (subparagraph a) or 
infraction of  the competition law (subparagraph k) neither and yet, definitions of  
these terms are given.
Concerning the change of  nomenclature, the notions of  final infringement 
decision and evidence must be considered.
Subparagraph h) “final decision” 
“A decision of  an authority of  competition that cannot or can no longer be subjected to 
ordinary appeal”.
It should be noted that the Directive does not define ‘final decision’, but instead, 
it defines ‘final infringement decision’, which refers to it as; “an infringement decision that 
cannot be, or that can no longer be, appealed by ordinary means”. That is, it embraces decisions 
from national authorities and court judgements.
In the proposal, it is chosen to define only as a final decision, the decisions 
rendered by authorities of  competition, making the writing of  Article 5(3), para. 
B, 6(5), and 7 (1) and (2) more complicated and potentiating eventual controversies 
about an issue that does not merit discussion. 
Subparagraph o) “pre-existing information”
“Evidence that exists irrespective of  the proceedings of  a competition authority, whether or not 
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such information is in the file of  a competition authority”.
The Directive defines with the same content as the proposal, “pre-existing 
information” [Article 2 (17)].
Amongst us such designation, however, – “pre-existing information” – is not 
that common. Nevertheless, when we talk about ‘pre-existing information’, we mean 
pre-produced evidence, i.e., evidence produced before the beginning of  the judicial 
case. The pre-existence is linked with the judicial proceeding. 
As this is the concept of  pre-existing evidence in our legal order, it seems rather 
incorrect to refer to pre-existing means of  proof  when alluding to means of  proof  
that exist regardless of  any AdC investigation, once they are not truly means of  
proof  ‘pre-existent to’, but rather ‘existent irrespective of’.
II. Article 3 - Liability
This article, one of  the most important, has some flaws that I consider problematic.
In paragraph 1, we read; “[t]he company or association of  companies that commit an 
infraction of  the competition law is obliged to fully compensate the ones who suffered harms caused by 
such infraction”.
Article 3 of  the Directive, under the title, “right to full compensation”, states that: 
“Member States shall ensure that any natural or legal person who has suffered harm caused by an 
infringement of  competition law is able to claim and to obtain full compensation for that harm”.
The writing of  the proposal of  transposition is substantially different from the 
writing of  the article of  the Directive. Indeed, it is distinct to say that the harmed ones 
have a right to compensation or that the infringers are obliged to compensate the 
damages.
In this case, the writing of  the Directive seems more appropriate because, in fact, 
the obligation to compensate only exists if, besides the infraction, the remaining elements 
of  liability are proved, namely the damages and the causal link. Therefore, it cannot be 
said that the infringers hold a direct and immediate obligation of  paying compensation. 
It is more adequate to say that the harmed ones are entitled to compensation. 
The chosen writing makes way for the argument that, to make emerge the 
obligation to compensate when there are damages, it is enough to prove the infraction, 
which is not right, as being the proof  of  the causal link indeed essential.
It should be noticed that Recital 11 of  the Directive, beyond referring expressively 
to the causal link, clarifies that “Where Member States provide other conditions for compensation 
under national law, such as imputability, adequacy or culpability, they should be able to maintain 
such conditions in so far as they comply with the case-law of  the Court of  Justice, the principles of  
effectiveness and equivalence, and this Directive”.
 In paragraph 2, we read “when a company includes a plurality of  legal persons, the action 
of  one of  them is equally imputable to the legal person or persons that constitute an economic unity or 
keep interdependence links and that over it have exercised determining influence”.
The intention of  this provision is to encompass the groups of  companies as 
provided for in Articles 488 and 489 of  the Commercial Company Code (Código das 
Sociedades Comerciais) and hold the dominant company (parent company) accountable 
(as expressively derived from paragraph 3).
The terminology used is in disharmony with our traditional legal language. Indeed, 
in our legal order, expressions such as “plurality of  legal persons” are not used, neither it is 
established that “the action of  one legal person is equally imputable to another legal person”.
In fact, neither the companies include a plurality of  legal persons nor the 
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infractions committed by a company are imputable to other. Companies are or might 
be in group relations or domain. On the other hand, it is not the imputation that is 
transmitted. What may be transmitted is the responsibility/liability resulting from the 
infringing action.
In accordance with the Commercial Company Code, the parent companies – 
dominant company – are accountable for the obligations of  the dominated companies 
– dominated society (Article 501, ex vi Article 491).
Considering paragraph 3 of  this Article (“It is presumed that a legal person exercises 
determining influence over other legal person when it holds its total shareholding”), it seems 
clear that the intention is to refer to companies with a full domain relation. As a 
consequence, a composition more consistent with our legal language should be 
chosen.
III. Article 7 - “Evidential value of the decisions of the competition 
authorities and court of appeals”  
According to paragraph 1 of  this Article, “the declaration of  the existence of  an 
infraction of  competition law by the Competition Authority through a definitive decision, or by a 
court of  appeal through a final judgment, constitutes a irrebuttable presumption of  the existence, 
nature and material, personal, temporal and territorial scope of  such infraction for effects of  the 
respective action for damages”. 
This article emerges from the transposition of  Article 9 of  the Directive and it 
can be said that, to a certain extent, it enshrines an enlargement of  the range already 
envisaged in Article 16(1), of  the Regulation 1/2003. 
The result of  this article, as it was already the result of  aforementioned Article 
16, respecting the Commission, is that in an action for infraction of  the competition 
rules in which a definitive decision of  AdC has been issued – confirmed in court 
in case of  appeal –, the court cannot appreciate the existence of  the infraction, i.e., 
the existence of  the infraction is considered proved. That includes the elements of  
material, personal, temporal and territorial scope of  such infraction. In the proposal, 
the choice is for the concept of  irrebuttable presumption, which I believe is correct.
The legality of  Article 16 was already questioned and, namely, its compatibility 
with Article 47 of  the Charter of  Fundamental Rights of  the European Union 
(CFREU) –that assures, in the Union law, the protection conferred by Article 
6(1) of  the European Convention of  Human Rights (ECHR) – that consecrates 
the principle of  effective judicial protection. Such principle embraces the rights of  
defence, equality of  arms, access to the courts and the right to ask for advice, defence 
and legal representation.
Indeed, one could ask if, when a court is prevented from appreciating the 
existence of  an infraction, the right of  effective judicial protection is being somehow 
limited, as the party is not allowed to defend him/herself  on what the practice of  the 
infraction is concerned since it is considered an established fact.
The Court of  Justice has addressed that question, clarifying why Article 16 
of  the Regulation does not violate Article 47 of  the Charter (Judgment Europese, 
C-199/11, of  6th November 2012).
In short, the reasons are the following:
1) An application of  the EU competition rules is, thus, based on an obligation 
of  Sincere Cooperation between the national courts, on the one hand, and the 
Commission and the EU Courts, on the other, in the context of  which each act, on 
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the basis of  the role assigned to it by the Treaty (Masterfoods and HB, paragraph 56). 
It must be borne in mind in that regard, that it is the EU Courts – not the courts of  
the Member States – which have exclusive jurisdiction to review the legality of  the 
acts of  the EU institutions. National courts do not have power to declare such acts 
invalid [see, to that effect, Case 314/85 Foto-Frost (1987) ECR 4199, paragraphs 12 to 
20] (paragraphs 52 and 53). 
2) The rule that national courts may not take decisions running counter to 
a Commission decision relating to a proceeding under Article 101 TFEU is thus 
a specific expression of  the division of  powers, within the EU, between, on the 
one hand, national courts and, on the other, the Commission and the EU Courts 
(paragraph 54).
3) EU law provides for a system of  judicial review of  Commission decisions 
relating to proceedings under Article 101 TFEU which affords all the safeguards 
required by Article 47 of  the Charter (paragraph 56).
4) The review provided for by the Treaties thus involves review by the EU 
Courts of  both the law and the facts, and means that they have the power to assess 
the evidence, to annul the contested decision and to alter the amount of  a fine. 
The review of  legality provided for in Article 263 TFEU, supplemented by the 
unlimited jurisdiction in respect of  the amount of  the fine, provided for in Article 
31 of  Regulation No. 1/2003, therefore meets the requirements of  the principle of  
effective judicial protection in Article 47 of  the Charter (see, to that effect, Chalkor v. 
Commission, paragraph 67) (paragraph 63).
5) Finally, a civil action for damages requires not only that a harmful event be 
found to have occurred, but also that loss and a direct link between the loss and 
that harmful event be established. Because of  its obligation not to take decisions 
running counter to a Commission decision finding an infringement of  Article 101 
TFEU, the national court is required to accept that where a prohibited agreement or 
practice exists, the existence of  loss and of  a direct causal link between the loss and 
the agreement or practice in question remains, by contrast, a matter to be assessed 
by the national court (paragraph 65).
Hence, although it is true that the obligation of  the national judge to not take 
decisions contrary to the decision of  the Commission that states an infraction of  
Article 101, TFEU forces this judge to conclude for the existence of  a cartel or a 
prohibited practice, it is necessary to precise that the verification of  damage and 
a direct causal link between that damage and the cartel or the prohibited practice 
continues subject to appreciation by the national judge.
The same reasoning can be transposed to the decisions of  AdC. Leaving out 
the first series of  arguments related with the duty of  loyal cooperation between the 
institutions of  the Union and the national legal organs as it is not applicable, the 
second series of  arguments has full application. On one hand, the appeal of  the 
AdC decisions to our national court is an unlimited jurisdiction appeal, ensuring 
that, if  the infringer was not appeased with the decision and lodged an appeal, it had 
the right to an absolutely fair and impartial trial in which it could defend itself. On 
the other hand, it is in the action where compensation is claimed that the proof  of  
the existence of  damage and the causal link between it and the infraction should be 
made.
The principle of  effective judicial protection is, thus, perfectly assured.
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The situation is different in paragraphs 2 and 3 of  this Article:
“2 – The declaration by an authority of  competition of  any Member State of  the Union, 
through a definitive decision, of  the existence of  an infraction of  the competition law constitutes 
a refutable presumption of  the existence, the nature and the material, personal, temporal and 
territorial scope of  such infraction for effects of  the respective action for damages”.
“3 – The declaration by the court of  appeal of  other Member State of  the Union, through 
a final decision, of  the existence of  an infraction of  the competition law constitutes a refutable 
presumption of  the existence, the nature and the material, personal, temporal and territorial scope 
of  such infraction for effects of  the respective action for damages”.
On the decision issued by authorities and courts of  other Member States, the 
Directive imposes that they can be presented in court; “at least prima facie evidence that 
an infringement of  competition law”.
In the transposition of  that precept, the national lawmakers conferred to the 
decisions of  authorities and courts of  other Member States the force of  rebuttable 
presumption of  the infraction.
Going back a little, the original writing of  paragraphs 2 and 3 of  this Article 
widened the binding and the nature of  irrebuttable presumption to the decision 
of  national authorities and the courts of  other Member States. After the process 
of  public discussion of  the proposal, the nature of  the presumption was altered to 
rebuttable.
Presumptions are, as Article 349 of  the Civil Code states “the conclusions that the 
law or the judge deduces from a known fact to determine a unknown one”. If  the presumption 
is irrebuttable, the party that has it favourable does not need to adduce evidence of  
the fact to which the presumption leads. If  it is rebuttable, it admits evidence to the 
contrary that is to be made by the one against whom the presumption works (Article 
350, Civil Code).
That means that in a typical action for damages based on the infringement of  
competition law, the infraction is presumed and the burden is on the defendant(s) to 
demonstrate that, notwithstanding a previous conviction, the infraction did not exist.
Differently to what happens in the case of  an enforceable decision of  AdC, 
in this case, the enshrined option must be evaluated. Indeed, on one hand, in the 
universe of  the 28 Member States, the national competition authorities do not have 
the same nature and independence. On the other hand, the regime of  appeals of  the 
national authorities decisions does not hold, in all Member States, the same nature of  
unlimited jurisdiction appeal. As a consequence, conferring to those the decisions the 
force of  rebuttable presumption (specially because the refutability is very difficult) 
may conflict with the right to effective judicial protection.
IV. Article 22 - “Amendments to the Judicial System Organisation 
Law (Lei de Organização do Sistema Judiciário)”
All the efforts and initiatives aiming at achieving a better efficacy and celerity 
in the solution of  judicial cases must be praised and supported. The better efficacy 
and celerity depends, I believe, namely on the specialisation of  courts and on the 
homogeneity in the interpretation and application of  laws, which is indispensable for 
legal certainty. However, as those initiatives always entail a more or less deep change 
in the system of  justice, they must reflect viable reforms, supported by concrete, 
effective and efficient measures.
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First of  all it is important to emphasise an apparent contradiction between 
Article 1(1) of  the project and the writing proposed to the new Article 112(4) of  the 
Lei de Organização do Sistema Judiciário (LOSJ). It is a preliminary draft of  transposition 
of  a Directive that refers to the actions for damages, based on an infringement to 
the rules of  competition law. That is expressly mentioned in what can be called the 
Preamble and reaffirmed in Article 1, which under the epigraph; “object and scope 
of  application” clearly states that; “[t]he current act establishes rules concerning claims for 
compensation based on infringements of  the competition law”.
It seems that there are no doubts that the statue encompasses, exclusively, actions 
for damages, which is provided for in this article on its object.
It occurs that, besides the proposition to add a paragraph 3 to Article 122 of  
LOSJ, which regulates the actions for damages, it is also proposed to add a paragraph 
4 in which the competence attributed to the Regulation, Competition and Supervision 
Court/Tribunal da Regulação, Concorrência e Supervisão (TRCS) would embrace; “all other 
civil actions”. That means that the law goes beyond and has a broader object than it 
defines itself  (the actions for damages based on infringements of  the competition law).
The reasons that substantiate the proposal of  amendment to the TCRS 
competence are, in theory and, in abstract, valid:
1) specificity of  matters of  competition law and economy and in the convenience that it is a 
specialised court to always handle with this sort of  matters, to the benefit of  quality of  judicial rulings 
and, in more general terms, the good administration of  justice and enhancement of  the legal culture of  
competition in Portugal. 
2) connection that, in most cases, will exist between the action for damages and the administrative 
offence suit which investigates and punishes the same infraction to the competition law, with the advantage 
of  profiting from the know how acquired in the judgment of  the AdC’s decision that had declared the 
existence of  the infraction, which will then base the claim for compensation.
The advantages of  specialisation are evident in any jurisdiction and particularly in 
an area of  law with the specificities of  competition law. It allows a deeper knowledge 
of  the matters and contributes to the uniformity of  the case-law, assuring the harmony 
and coherence of  the entire legal system.
Yet, when we analyse, in practice, the impact of  the proposed new competence, 
it is possible to conclude that the reasoning is rather theoretical.
The proposal is to attribute competences to the TCRS in order to
“3 - judge actions for damages whose claim is exclusively based on competition law infringements 
; actions aiming the exercise of  the right of  recourse amongst co-infringers as well as claims of  access to 
means of  proof  relating to such actions in the terms stipulated in this law”.
4 - It is still under the court’s competence to judge all other civil actions whose claim is based 
exclusively in infringements of  the competition law provided for in Articles 9, 11 and 12 of  the Lei 
n.º 19/2012, of  8th May 2012, and/or Articles 101 and 102, TFEU”.
It should be noted that it is not established the attribution of  competence of  
the TCRS to the measures of  preservation of  the means of  proof  which are stated in 
Article 17 of  the proposal. As we know that the competence of  “specialised” courts 
is solely the one written in law, with the residual jurisdiction belonging to the local 
division for civil matters (secções locais cíveis). Therefore, it would be convenient to add 
this competence in paragraph 3 so that potential conflicts of  jurisdiction are prevented.
Looking at the analysis of  the amendments proposed to the TCRS competence, 
it is should be considered that, notwithstanding the fact that there will be a single 
specialised court to a part of  actions and litigation related to competition law, there is still 
® UNIO - EU LAW JOURNAL Vol. 3, No. 2, July 2017
156 Maria José Costeira
a large amount of  cases, perhaps the majority, which stays away from the specialisation.
In fact, all the cases in which the cause of  action is not uniquely the competition 
law infringement, as well as the ones in which the competition law is invoked in the 
defendant pleading, i.e., most of  the pending cases in our courts, are excluded from the 
TCRS’ competence. 
On the other hand, there is still a considerable number of  cases that will remain in 
the administrative courts where the private enforcement actions have been increasing. 
According to the study of  the Centre for Research in European, Economic, 
Financial and Tax Law – CIDEEFF,1 the history of  the actions of  private enforcement 
in Portugal are the following: 
“over the last 5 complete years (2011 to 2015), there was a total of  106 rulings on competition 
private enforcement (excluding the Instituto da Vinha), in an average of  21,2 per year. In 2015 
there were 212% more rulings than in 2011. Even admitting an increase in the rising trend to 
250% over the course of  the next 5 years, by 2020 there would be a total of  265 rulings and 
an average of  53 decisions per year, in all instances and all courts of  the country. Those numbers 
are probably an optimistic estimative (…). 
Hence, out of  the 88 cases of  restricting practises analysed, only 7, at the most, would fall under 
the competence of  the TCRS thereby defined (less than 8%). But, in one of  these cases, the courts 
“amended” the claim of  the plaintiff  to other private law claim. And in three other cases it is 
possible that allegations of  regulatory and/or private law had been raised. Only one of  the cases 
is not a follow-on or mixed action, and they are all recent actions, what may suggest an evolving 
process that leads in the future to a larger number of  actions with that configuration.
That means that, in an optimistic preview (based on the maintenance of  the same rhythm of  
AdC decision-making procedure), the clause of  centralisation of  cases in the TCRS will bring 
to this court about 3 cases a year, in average, over the next years, and the majority of  the cases 
in which private enforcement issues are raised will continue to be heard in other courts of  first 
instance”.
Then, it seems clear that a true specialisation concerning the private enforcement 
actions will not take place. 
Likewise, the proposed specialisation in the higher courts presents some flaws.
Currently, in first instance there is only specialisation for public enforcement. 
The AdC decisions are subjected to appeal to the TCRS and the appeal from its 
decisions are lodged in the Tribunal da Relação de Lisboa (Court of  Appeal) where they 
are distributed always to the same criminal division. In turn, the remedies against the 
decisions rendered by the Tribunal da Relação de Lisboa lodged in the Supremo Tribunal de 
Justiça (Supreme Court of  Justice) are always distributed to the same criminal division, 
pursuant to Article 54 and 74 of  LOSJ.
The proposal introduces amendments that I consider incoherent and that do not 
contribute to the specialisation of  high courts.
The proposal of  the writing of  the Article 54, LOSJ is ‘the cases referred in Article 
112 are always distributed to the same criminal division, except for the cases mentioned 
in Article 112(2) to (4), which are always distributed to the same civil division’.
The proposal of  writing of  the Article 67, LOSJ is ‘until the installation of  the 
competition, regulatory and supervision division, the actions referred to in Article 112 
are always distributed to the same division’. 
1 Available at: http://www.cideeff.pt/xms/files/Projeto_4_grupo_III/Jurisprudencia_de_Private_
Enforcement.pdf. 
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In what concerns the Supremo Tribunal de Justiça, it derives from the proposal that 
the choice is for a specialisation in two different dimensions: private enforcement (civil) 
on one hand and public enforcement (administrative offence suits) on the other. That 
results from the proposal of  amendment of  Article 54, which expressly attributes 
the competences separately for the cases stipulated in Article 112(1) LOSJ (public 
enforcement) and in Article 112(2) to (4) (administrative offence suits and private 
enforcement) respectively to a criminal division and a civil matters division. 
As for the Tribunal da Relação, it seems that the objective, until a competition, 
regulatory and supervision division is created, which I think will be unlikely to happen 
due to the short number of  cases, is to attribute the competence to a single division. 
The question is to know to which division will be the competence attributed. Will it 
be to a civil matters division or to a criminal division? And who will determine the 
competent division? Will it be the President of  the Tribunal da Relação to decide?
The different writing of  this article in comparison with the proposal for Article 
54 does not allow any other interpretation, namely, it does not allow one to understand 
that the intention is to split the administrative offence matter and the civil matter and 
to attribute the competence to the first, to a criminal division and to the second, to a 
civil division.
In conclusion, we will have a single court of  first instance with competence to 
hear all the cases provided for in Article 112, a single division in the Tribunal da Relação 
de Lisboa with competence to hear the same cases, but then, at the Supreme Court level, 
that competence is shared between a criminal division and a civil division.
It seems to be in question not only the coherence of  the system, but also the real 
specialisation of  high courts.
